Rr 49 Chile Protect (#\$199900030) BXCISE U.S. Department of State Denv **Release** 🗶 In Full Declassify: In Part___ Exemption(s) BI 11 AUGUST 1970 RECD 11 AUG 22207 Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir () Classify as () Extend as () Downgrade to FROM: SANTIAGO Date 2/1/01 Declassify on _____ Reason 25X1 TO: DIRECTOR THE FOLLOWING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY: FOR CRIMMINS FROM KORRY 18 0:4/300000, PERMIT ME THREE QUICK COMMENTS' 1. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF A DULY-Α. LECTED AND INAUGURATED ALLENDE BEING OVERTHROWN, I DO NOT REGARD AS A VERY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED Β. AFTER THE 20140 ELECTIONS AND PRIOR TO INAUGURATION. THE PROHIBITIONS IMPOSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS C. EMB MAKE MY FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCOMPASS G Jamer R FIRM KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY MEN. 2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. IT IS THE CT ESTIMATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE CONDITIONS OR MOTIVATIONS FOR A MILITARY OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE MILITARY IMPLIES ARMY SINCE WITHOUT THE WILL PREVAIL. EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT SUPPORT OF THE ARMY, THE OTHERS (CARABINEROS, NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT. ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE IMPLUSE FOR ARMY INTERVENTION. FOR SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE, THE 46S

66

EXCISE Department of State Deny Excise In Ful assify: In Part LASSIFIFN RECOL emption(s) 11 AUG 2220Z 11 AUGUST 1970 FROM: SANTIAGO TO: DIRECTOR 100001× 131 50001 THE FOLLOWING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY: FOR CRIMMINS FROM KORRY PERMIT ME THREE QUICK COMMENTS 1. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF A DULY-LECTED AND INAUGURATED ALLENDE BEING OVERTHROWN, I DO NOT REGARD AS A VERY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED Β. FTER_THE ELECTIONS AND PRIOR TO INAUGURATION. THE PROHIBITIONS IMPOSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS C. EM B MAKE MY FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCOMPASS Visuer FIRM KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY MEN. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, 2. IT IS THE CT ESTIMATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE 5 CONDITIONS OR MOTIVATIONS FOR A MILITARY OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE 5 MILITARY IMPLIES ARMY SINCE WITHOUT THE WILL PREVAIL. 0 X. EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT SUPPORT OF THE ARMY, THE OTHERS (CARABINEROS, NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT. ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE IMPLUSE FOR ARMY INTERVENTION. FOR SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE, THE INT ASSE 46S

PAGE 2

TINCLASSIFIED

Very un show

SUPPORTERS OF ALESSANDRI WOULD HAVE TO FOMENT A SERIOUS AND COORDINATED CHALLENGE TO THE FREI GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY AND FREI WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THE DELIBERATE ROLE OF IMPOTENT OR CONNIVER. WHILE SUCH A SCENARIO IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY ONCE THE CONGRESS ELECTS ALLENDE. AN ATTEMPT TO ROB ALLENDE OF HIS TRIUMPH BY, SAY, A GENERAL VIAUX. WHO HAS A CERTAIN MYSTIQUE WITHIN THE ARMY, WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD FAIL IN A POST-CONGRESSSIONAL DECISION PERIDO AND BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE POST-INAUGURATION UNLESS ALLENDE IMPRUDENTLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY AROUSED ARMY ANIMUS BY FLOUTING ITS INSTITUTION-ALITY.

3. IN CONSIDERING ALL THE PERMUTATIONS, THREE SEPARATE TIME FRAMES MUST BE KEPT IN VIEW: SEPT 5 OCT 24 WHEN THE CONGRESS BEGINS ITS ELECTORAL DELIBERATIONS; FROM NOV. 4 ON WHEN ALLENDE IS PRESIDENT.

4. FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS RE POSSIELE MILITARY INFLUENCES OR ACTIONS INCLUDE THAT ALLENDE FINISHES FIRST BY A MARGIN OF LESS THAN 100,000, OR THAT HE FINISHES SECOND BY LESS THAN 100,000. (IF HE HAS THE FIRST MAJORITY BY MORE THAN 100,000 IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR CONGRESS TO OVERTURN. HIS ELECTION AND EQUALLY UNLIKELY THAT INTERVENTION BY ANY-THING EXCEPT DEATH COULD HALT HIS INAUGURATION AND PRESIDENCY; ALTERNATIVELY IF HE LOSES BY MORE THAN 100,000, HE HAS LITTLE

UNCLASSIFIED

HOPE OF OVERTURNING THE ELECTORAL ORDER;) IF HIS FORCES SOUGHT TO DO SO, IT IS LIKELY THEY WOULD BE FRUSTBATED FIRST IN THE CONGRESS AND IF NOT THERE THEN POSSIBLY BY MILITARY INTER-VENTION.) DOUBTLESS THERE ARE MANY ACTIVE OFFICERS PERSONALLY 5. OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF AN ALLENDE PRESIDENCY. THE HAS PUT REPORTED HIS VIEWS AND FORWARD THE COINCIDENTAL NAMES OF O WHICH COULD BE ADDED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT CONSIDERING VIEWS BUT THE WILL AND THE CAPACITY TO ACT AND TO CONTROL. THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE ARMY TODAY IS GEN 6. SCHNEIDER. THE SCHNEIDER DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION AND

PAGE 3

INCLASSIFIED

SANTIAGO

UNCLASSIFIED

31

OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DECISION TO NAME_EITHER OF THE FIRST TWO CANDIDATES HAS BEEN WIDELY_ACCEPTED. SCHNEIDER IS THE ONE CHILEAN GENERAL FOR WHOM FREI SAID_IO ME HE HOLDS ANY RESPECT. I AM PERSUADED SCHNEIDER MADE HIS CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENT WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE_IF_NOT_PROMPT-ING OF FREI: I AM FURTHER PERSUADED THAT ONE PURPOSE WAS TO MAINTAIN THE INSTITUTIONAL UNITY OF THE ARMY AT A DIFFICULT TIME (AND WITH A VIAUX IN THE WINGS) AND THAT THIS AIM IS SEGRET

PAGE 4

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>_</u>____

SANTIAGO

INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ARMY; I AM CONVINCED THAT SCHNEIDER HAD TOMIC IN MIND AS POSSIBLE SECOND OR ALLENDE AS A FIRST WHEN HE ISSUED HIS STATEMENT AND WISHED TO KEEP OPEN OPTIONS. THE FREI-SCHNEIDER RELATIONSHIP IS THEREFORE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT ABOUT WHICH WE KNOW LITTLE.

7. THE FREI-SCHNEIDER GAMBIT TO HELP TOMIX AND TO KEEP THE ARMY UNITED AND APOLITICAL HAS INCREASED THE PRESSURES ON THE POLITICIANS WHO WILL HAVE TO VOTE IN CONGRESS STARTING OCT. 24TH. IT SHOULD MEAN THAT THE ARMY WILL GUARANTEE ORDER UNTIL THAT VOTE STARTS AND THAT IT WILL NOT BPT NOT PERMIT M OB MUSCLE OT DISRUPT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.

8. IF MY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE FREI-SCHWEIDER RELATION-SHIP ARE CORRECT, THEN IF ALLENDE SHOULD WIN THE FIRST MAJORITY BY LESS THAN 100,000, THE MORE OR LESS UNITED ARMY WILL ASSURE AT LEAST AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE CONGRESS TO BLOCK ALLENDE'S ASCENDANCY BY ELECTION OF THE RUNNERUP. IT IS CONCEIVABLE TOO THAT THE ARMY MIGHT TAKE CERTAIN SYMBOLIC ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO PUT ITS STAMP OF APPROVAL ON THE NEWLY CHOSEN PRESIDENT PRIOR TO INAUGURATIONS. 9. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT FREI HAS TOLD VISITORS THAT IF ALLENDE WINS THE FIRST MAJORITY THERE WILL BE A "GOLPE DE ESTADO" (WITHOUT DEFINING IF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD ACT

UNILATERALLY OR ON HIS URGING). WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL SUBSTAN-



TIATION, I BELIEVE THIS LEAKING TO BE ELECTORAL IN PURPOSE. I GUESS THAT FREI IS SPREADING THE WORD IN ORDER TO AFFECT THE SEPT. 4TH VOTING AND THAT HE HAS CALCULATED THAT BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS AND THE MARXIST-LENINISTS HERE WOULD PUBLICIZE THIS POSSIBILITY AS INDEED BOTH HAVE. I RECKON FREI BELIEVES THAT THIS PROPAGANDA-CONJURING MIGHT DISSUADE SOME DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR ALLENDE. IT COULD CONCEIVABLY MEAN WHAT HE SAYS BUT I HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT.

PAGE 5

UNCLASSIFIED

SANTIAGO

10. THE CONDITIONS THAT CURRENTLY PREVAIL IN THE ARMY MAKE DOUBTFUL ANY EFFECTIVE ARMY MOVE TO BLOCK ALLENDE. WHILE YOUNGER OFFICERS MIGHT WANT ACTION FOR ACTION'S SAKE, AND WHILE SOME MIGHT ACCURATELY CALCULATE THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD DOUBTLESS LEAD TO GREATER RESPONSIBILITY, GREATER POWER AND GREATER STATUS, THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE TROOPS WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW THEIR OFFICERS FOR SUCH A PURPOSE AND THERE IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERABLE ALLENDE SENTIMENT AMONG THE NON-COMS OR AT THE VERY MINIMUM AN UNWILLINGNESS TO OBSTRUCT HIM. THE PARTISAN FACTIONALISM OF HIGHER OFFICERS ACTS TO REINFORCE THEIR GENERAL RELUCTANCE AND INCAPACITY TO



UNGLASSIFIED

GOVERN.

11. IN ORDER TO REVERSE IHIS OUTLOOK, A GROUP OF OFFICERS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO (A) PLAN AN EFFECTIVE TAKEOVER WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF SCHNEIDER OR THE GOC AND (B) EXPLOIT A CONTRIVED OR UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITY THAT COULD BE ACCEPTED BY A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE ARMY AND PUBLIC AS A RATIONALE FOR A GOLPE. WHILE THE ARMY AND PUBLIC AS A RATIONALE FOR A GOLPE. WHILE THE ARMY AND PUBLIC OF A GOOD MANY. ALESSANDRISTAS ARE PLAYING WITH THIS IDEA, I THINK IT A NON-STARTER WITHOUT THE BLESSING OF FREI, IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT, AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSIST-ANCE OR POLITICAL ACTION. WE ARE EXCLUDING ANY FOREIGN TROOP HYPOTHESIS.

PAGE 6

UNCLASSIFIED

12. WHILE ALL SORTS OF CARIBBEAN CABALS CAN BE PLOTTED AND WE HAVE INDULGED IN SPINNING SOME OUT, THEY STRIKE ME AS FANCIFUL AND REALLY UNPLANNABLE BECAUSE OF THE ARMY'S CON-DITION AND BECAUSE OF CHILE PARTICULARITIES. I. REMAIN UNSWAYED, IN MY VIEW THAT FREI IS A CRITICAL AND DOMINANT FIGURE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE HE IS PRESIDENT BUT BECAUSE HE IS THE MOST POPULAR AND THEREFORE AND MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICIAN IN CHILE. THIS JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS IMPLYING THAT FREI HAS THE GUTS TO TAKE HARD DECISIONS; INDEED, HIS PRO-CLIVITY IS TO TRANSACT AND TO AVOID UNPLEASANTNESS UNLESS HE IS PUSHED.

INT ASSEED

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 7 THE CRUCIAL 13. PERIOD IS SEPT. 5 TO OCT 24 WHEN VARIOUS PERTINENT POSSIBILITIES WILL OCCUR: IF WE ASSUME ALLENDE HAS WON BY LESS THEN Α. 100,000, THEN HIS SUPPORTERS HAVE A KEEN INTEREST IN Jone AVOIDING ANY MILITARY INTERVENTION THAT WOULD ROB THEM OF THEIR ELECTORAL TRIUMPH. IF TOMIC WERE SECOND, ALLENDE COULD ONLY BE BLOCKED FROM THE PRESIDENCY BY THE NACIONALES AND/OR DISSIDENT RADICALS VOTING FOR FREI WOULD PULL OUT ALL STOPS FOR TOMIC AND TOMIC. WOULD, I PREDICT, SEEK OUR AND THE ARMY'S SUPPORT IN APPLYING PRESSURES. Ε. IF ALESSANDRI WERE SECOND, WE FACE AN EXTRA-ORDINARY STEM-WINDER. ALESSANDRI HAS SAID THAT HE WILL ACCEPT THE WINNER OF THE FIRST MAJORITY AS DEFINITIVE. THE NACIONALES HAVE SAID THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE MAN WHO HAD THE FIRST MAJORITY. THUS THESE PLEDGES WOULD HAVE TO BE IGNORED AND MOREOVER THE PDC WOULD HAVE TO THROW THEIR VOTES TO ALESSANDRI AS WELL IF ALLENDE WERE NOT TO BECOME PRESIDENT. CAME HNINVITED TO THE RESIDENCE SHNDAY AUG 9 TO SPECULATE INTER ALIA ON THIS HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT IF ALESSANDRI WERE ELECTED BY

ite state and

INCLASSFED

SECRET PAGE 8

UNCLASSIFIED

SANTIAGO]

Allende #2

CONGRESS, THE OLD MAN COULD KEEP HIS ELECTORAL PLEDGE TO RESPECT THE FIRST MAJORITY BY REFUSING ID ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY. (ALESSANDRI HAS ALWAYS SAID HE WOULD NOT SEEK TO GOVERN WITHOUT EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND SUCH RENUNCIATION WOULD ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS VIEW.) IF ALESSANDRI REFUSED THE CONGRESSIONAL WILL, THEN, ACCORDING TO PABLO, NEW ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CALLED WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE ACTING AS INTERIM FREI WOULD BE A CANDIDATE IN THE NEW PRESIDENT. ELECTION AND WOULD SURELY WIN AN OVERWHEIMING MAJORITY (AND PABLO WOULD HAVE REACHED THE HEIGHTS BY BEING REGISTERED IN HISTORY AS ONE OF CHILE'S PRESIDENTS.) IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WOULD BE A DEAL BETWEEN NACIONALES AND PDC TO BLOCK ALLENDE AND TO RE-ELECT FREI. THE SUP-PORT OF SCHNEIDER AND THE ARMY IN THE FACE OF CERTAIN MARXIST MOB VIOLENCE, GENERAL STRIKES AND MIR CRIMES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ESSENTIAL. SO WOULD OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INTELLIGENCE DATA, AND COVERT MORALY SUPPORT. С. IF ALLENDE WERE TO FINISH SECOND WITHIN 100,000 VOTES OF ALESSANDRI, THE PROBLEM IS NO LESS COMPLEX. THERE WOULD BE PERHAPS A THIRD OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATES

(THAT IS UP TO 25) IN THE CONGRESS DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR


SECRET[®] INFLASSIFIED


ALLENDE AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME ORTHODOX RADICALS PRE-PARED TO ABANDON ALLENDE IN THE SECRET BALLOT. UNLESS FREI AND HIS LIEUTENANTS WERE TO EXERCISE ALL OF THEIR INFLUENCE WITHIN THE PARTY AND UNLESS ALL LEVERS OF PRESSURE WERE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE RADICALS, THE ALLENDE FORCES WOULD PREVAIL. (PERHAPS THIS IS THE PLACE TO INTERPOSE A JUDGMENT ON TOMIC. IF HE FINISHES WELL BEHIND THE OTHER TWO, FREI'S INFLUENCE IN THE PDC WILL BE CONSIDERABLE; BUT IF TOMIC IS THIRD BY A COM-PARAT IVEL Y SMALL NUMBER OF VOTES THE RECRIMINATIONS AGAINST FREI BY THE TOMICISTAS WILL BE BITTER AND THEIR IN CLINATIONS (INCLUDING TOMIC'S) TO FIGHT FREI AND TO HELP ALLENDE WILL BE VERY POWERFUL.) NO ONE HERE CAN CONCEIVE OF ANY SUPPORTABLE SCHEME 14. FOR A U.S. ROLE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE MILITARY FOR REASONS GIVEN ABOVE. AND WITHOUT A U.S. TACTICAL ROLE, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SUGGEST WHAT THE MIGHT DO; THEY WISH US TO TELL TIME. 15. BUT AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET THERE, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. DOES HAVE AN OPPORT<u>UNITY TO PLAY</u> A CONSTRUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE ROLE IN WHICH THE MILITARY WOULD BE <u>INCLUD</u>ED. IT IS BECAUSE WE HAVE THE POWER TO INFLUENCE

PAGE 9 UNCLASSIFIED

INCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED AGE 11 SANTIAGO FAM IL IAR POPULAR UNITY TUNE OF THE OTHER SIDE. FROM CABINET MINISTERS WHO ACCOMPANIED FREI ON THE 12 HOUR INAUGUR-ATION OF EL TENIENTE'S EXPANSION SATURDAY, I HEARD URGINGS THAT THE CASTRO ADMISSION OF FAILURE BE PLAYED TO THE HILT. TOLD ME THAT THE CRITICAL TIME FRAME WILL 17. THE FLECTIONS WHEN THE BIDDING BE THE FTR ST FORTNIGHT FOR CONGRESSIONAL VOTES EEGINS. I SHARE THE DEPT'S DESIRE TO PROTECT THE PRESIDENT AND THE EMBASSY TO THE MAX IM UM EXTENT FROM AND EXPOSURE. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE USUAL ALTERNATIVES-WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SITUATION AND MORE RISKY OF FAILURE AND EXPOSURE THAT ANYTHING I MIGHT DO. TO RECONCILE THESE PREDCCUPATIONS THALLD WAING ... 31 Β. B







This document is from the holdings of: The National Security Archive Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037 Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Read related article:

'Extreme Option: Overthrow Allende'

2020-09-15