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2/25/98

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, November 18, 1986

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

Chile

Agenda

- |                                |                                   |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| I. Introduction                | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes) |
| II. Intelligence Assessment    | Director Casey<br>(10 minutes)    |
| III. Review of US Policy Goals | Secretary Shultz<br>(10 minutes)  |
| IV. General Discussion         | All Participants<br>(30 minutes)  |
| V. Summary                     | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes) |

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TALKING POINTS

- Mr. President, we are meeting on Chile to review recent developments and trends there, and to assess our current policy and strategy in light of these.
- At the onset it should be clear to all of us: the US government and this administration in particular want Chile to return to its 150-year-old democratic tradition.
- Not only is this in US interests, but because Chile's democratic experience is also coupled with the experience of actually living under a Marxist President, I believe Chileans have invaluable insights to offer the new members of the democratic community developing in the Western Hemisphere.
- So the key decision is not whether or not we want a democracy in Chile. We do. The question for us is how we can most effectively contribute to a democratic outcome in Chile.
- In the coming weeks, we will have to make specific decisions about Chile. Some of these are: how to vote on Chile's Structural Adjustment Loan at the World Bank; whether or not to introduce a US resolution on Chile at the UN General Assembly; and whether to certify to the Congress that Chile should keep its GSP status.
- While there has been interagency discussion and debate on the merits of these, today I think we use our time most wisely by discussing our overall policy and strategies so that these particular decisions can be made in the context of an effectively constructed and carefully calibrated policy.

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- The situation today in Chile is complex and there are many key actors, ranging from Pinochet, the armed forces, the Junta, the democratic opposition, the communists and their Soviet and Cuban patrons, to the US Government and the US Congress.
- Therefore I would like to outline the following set of needs that I think our policy and actions should take into consideration:
  - the need to sustain the positive role of the three pro-transition Junta members and support their efforts to get the Army to join them in the transition;
  - the need to respond to the security and institutional concerns of the Army and avoid actions that foster a nationalistic and/or "rally around Pinochet" attitude;
  - the need to assess how US actions, especially those which could be interpreted as withdrawal of US support from the regime, affect Soviet/Cuban/Chile Communist Party actions and strategy;
  - the need to move the democratic opposition to a more disciplined and pragmatic posture so they gain credibility with the Army;
  - the need to take actions that constitute effective pressure on Pinochet and avoid those which are counterproductive; and the need to maintain our access to and influence with Pinochet and his inner circle;
  - the need to maintain progress in Chile's excellent economic recovery program;



- the need to respond credibly to Congressional concerns about Chile, in particular regarding human rights.
- We will hear from Director Casey about recent developments and trends -- both positive and negative -- currently underway in Chile. Secretary Shultz will outline our goals and current strategy.